Mexico is going through a delicate moment in its relationship with the United States, and denying that does not change it. We are not facing a diplomatic misunderstanding or a simple political dispute: Washington no longer sees our country as a partner with internal problems, but as a place where power is no longer in the hands of the state. This is not an ideological interpretation or rhetorical exaggeration, but rather the technical perception that prevails in the US capital and explains the practical decisions taken by Donald Trump’s administration since January 2025.
The imposition of tariffs on Mexican exports responds to a specific interpretation: the United States considers that our country has not effectively contained the flow of drugs into its territory nor has it curbed the financial circuits that feed the cartels, particularly those of Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación, designated as terrorist organizations by its State Department.
While pompous speeches about sovereignty and dignity were being made here, a legal case was being built there, structured around facts, financial flows, and illicit trafficking routes. The result is a policy that goes beyond rhetoric: tariff cuts, warnings to strategic sectors, and sustained pressure on Mexico to demonstrate concrete results in reducing the trafficking of fentanyl and other drugs.
While there is talk of trade adjustments, the real source of the conflict remains the perception that Mexico has been unable to contain organized crime and separate the actions of the state from the activities of drug trafficking groups. This accusation did not arise at a rally or in a partisan debate; it was made by the White House, which explicitly accused the Mexican government of facilitating “safe havens” and trafficking routes that jeopardize US security.
Neither China nor Russia, the United States’ strongest economic and political competitors, have made any significant statements on this situation because their priorities are different. For Beijing, Mexico represents just another market and a manufacturing access point. For Moscow, tensions between our country and the US government do not serve its own direct strategic objectives, so there is no reason to intervene in a conflict that does not bring tangible benefits. This silence is not complicity; it is geopolitical calculation.
Now, why would Mexico not be the victim of a military attack as happened in Venezuela, despite Trump’s provocative statements linking drug trafficking to the Mexican government? The answer is simple: the United States is not seeking military intervention because its goal is not occupation, but rather the reconfiguration of the Mexican state’s behavior. A direct military campaign would have enormous strategic and political costs for Washington, which prefers to apply pressure through economic sanctions, trade restrictions, and legal actions focused on disrupting the financing and routes of criminal groups.
The damage caused by the 4T, begun by Andrés Manuel López Obrador and continued by Claudia Sheinbaum, lies in the fact that political discourse has replaced technical and effective action. By prioritizing political narratives over measurable results in security and trade documentation, the Mexican government has ceded initiative. That image of incompetence has been consumed by U.S. decision-makers, who are now orienting their policy toward the structural weakening of illicit circuits in the country, without the need for headlines or public confrontations.
Meanwhile, here we continue to act as if nothing were happening: responding with diplomatic smiles, denying evidence, and confusing confidence with denial. And let it be noted that mocking the president is not a personal attack; it is a criticism of her inability to respond clearly and effectively to what is no longer a domestic problem, but a bilateral and hemispheric issue that requires technical responses, not rhetorical gestures.
